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DEMOCRACY

IN

MODERN COMMUNITIES.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

OF

M. GUIZOT.

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE following Essay by M. Guizot appeared in a recent number of the "Revue Française," and can only be obtained in the original by the Subscribers to that Review. It has created a powerful sensation, not only in Paris, but throughout the Continent, and shortly after its appearance in that Capital it was translated into German,* and received with much approbation.

The Translator is aware that this Essay has already appeared in English; but without for a moment supposing that his own Translation is free from errors, he feels justified in remarking, that the one to which he alludes is executed in a careless manner, and in many instances distorts the meaning of the Author.

* Die Demokratie in den neueren Gesellschaften von Franz Guizot; mit Genehmigung des Verfassers übertragen von Dr. Martin Runkel. Elberfeld, Becker.

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1. *De la Démocratie nouvelle, ou des Mœurs et de la Puissance des Classes moyennes en France;*
Par M. Edouard Alletz.
2. *Essai sur l'Organisation démocratique de la France;*
Par Auguste Billiard.

M. Alletz and M. Billiard both commence by asserting, as a preliminary, that the structure of modern society in France is democratic—thoroughly democratic; and that, consequently, her whole course of policy, together with her institutions, laws, government, and administration, must repose upon this basis, and be moulded so as to become adapted to this state of feeling.

Having disposed of this point, M. Alletz proceeds to show, that the natural result of this condition of society is the consolidation of a constitutional monarchy (as established by the Revolution of 1830), in the spirit of our charter, and in

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the persons of the present dynasty,—a form of government favourable to the preponderance of the middle classes, who constitute a new species of democracy, consonant with its spirit, and capable of rendering it, in its operation, subservient to the best interests of society.

On the contrary, M. Billiard, adopting the same principle at the outset (viz. the acknowledged democratic condition of society), infers, that it must inevitably tend to establish an equality of political rights, universal suffrage, and, in fact, end in a republic;—an organisation which, according to his theory, is alone capable of affording satisfaction and security to a community declared to be essentially democratic.

What, then, we are prompted to inquire is this democracy—what is the nature of this sovereign principle, which forces to conclusions so opposite, two sincere and enlightened men, both of whom admit its existence, without a word of question or of doubt?

Neither the one nor the other has vouchsafed to inform us, nor indeed does either appear even to have proposed such a question to himself. Each assumes the democratic state and tendency of society to be a point thoroughly established and universally acknowledged; and the only task which each appears to have proposed to himself, is, that of showing what mode of government he considers to be best assimilated to such a state of public feeling.

The case of M. Alletz and M. Billiard is one of daily occurrence, and one which presents itself to our observation whithersoever we turn. Doubtless, neither division is wanting in political opinions, nor animosity in the parties by whom they are espoused: yet all with feelings either of pleasure or regret, as the case may be, while they either congratulate themselves upon the fact or deplore it, or resign themselves contentedly to it, as it were to something inevitable,—all unanimously concur in admitting that the present state of society is thoroughly democratic, and that the democratic principle will ultimately triumph over every other.

Assuredly there must be truth, considerable truth in this opinion, otherwise how could it have become so unanimously adopted? But there is nevertheless much that appears both perplexing and obscure connected with it; for how otherwise is it that a principle which is by common consent represented to be so clearly and so indisputably established, can admit of such different interpretations, and conduce to such opposite results?

To this question I hasten to reply; argument, discussion, science, and the press combined, are insufficient to elucidate matters at once so complex and so stupendous. This power is alone reserved to Providence, time, and the course of events. In order that a system which governs and characterises a state of society may become generally known and comprehended, it is necessary that it should first have undergone a long trial, that it should have been well considered in its progress, that its different phases, its remote consequences, should have been ascertained, and that successive generations should have studied it while witnessing its operation.

Democracy has but just made its *début* upon the stage—its triumph is only of yesterday—God alone can know how many generations must pass away before its true nature and its ultimate tendency can be placed in their proper light. Although, however, such problems are beyond the scope of human comprehension, we should still be highly culpable were we to neglect the consideration of them, or wait inactively and unconcernedly for their solution. It must not be forgotten that the scene of their solution is also our appointed sphere of action; and these problems so stupendous, and necessarily involved in such profound obscurity, are destined to regulate the condition of communities, and while they decide our happiness or our misery they may be said almost to govern our virtues or our vices. The course of events, which we can neither vary nor control, must nevertheless be accomplished through the agency of those powers, physical and mental, with which we are endowed.

We all play certain parts upon the stage, less important perhaps than our vanity dreams of, but yet parts which are real, active, and influential, as well as indispensable to the *denouement* of the grand drama. In creating us free and intelligent beings, God has assigned us a share in his work, and a share in our own destiny. Such is the course of action prescribed for us. It is for our interest as well as for our honour never to renounce it. "When man exalts himself," says Pascal, "I would reduce him to his proper level; when he sinks below it, I would exalt him." It is the part of duty and of true wisdom to regulate our conduct by the rule of Pascal, and to acknowledge at once the dignity, and confess the weakness, of our position. We exist and think in the bosom of profound darkness, and the lamp with which we are supplied is but small; nevertheless such as it is we possess it, and by its light we are destined to pursue our steps under the protection of that Sovereign Power who has bestowed it upon us, and who is himself our guide.

Some have even asserted, that inquire and argue as much as we please concerning the existing democracy, all our inquiries and all our arguments will be unavailing; that the principle is established either for good or for evil, and that it is beyond our power to interfere with or to alter it.

Granted that this principle is established; may it prove happily so! But is it at the very moment of its birth both perfect and immutable? Is there no room either for discussion or improvement? And if there be, can we be so lost and so infatuated as to consider that it would be useless to attempt it?

I cannot bring myself to treat the minds of men in general, and the wisdom of my own times in particular, with such contempt. I attach more faith to the influence of discussion and of reason, more faith to the progress of successive generations, while, at the same time, I entertain more doubts as to the perfect truth and the absolute irrevocability of the ideas and the judgments which each of them leaves on record in its course. In our days, especially, it is difficult to listen without a smile to language characterised by such dogmatical levity. How often have we beheld experience contradicted, and the good sense of the community induced to renounce pretended principles which, for the moment, had been lauded as the very *omega* of science! How often have we beheld constitutions overturned, and laws repealed, which their founders and promulgators fondly declared were built upon everlasting foundations, and which, according to them, were calculated to establish the eternal happiness of the community! Let us confess the truth: there is much to investigate, much that needs elucidation in ideas which are at this moment most influential, and which receive almost universal deference. Amongst others, ideas upon democracy have scarcely yet begun to be examined and comprehended. For their stability as well as for their reputation, for the increase and extension of their influence, they have yet to stand the test of much examination and much proof. One point, indeed, is certain, that succeeding generations will not fail to submit them to these tests. May they then be prepared and placed in such a state as to pass through the ordeal!

Words have their star: they spring up in the midst of certain circumstances which determine for ages their signification and the character of the principles which they designate.

Seek from science a definition of Democracy; and observe the captivating answers which she has invariably at hand. Democracy is the government of the people; that is to say, a government in which all possess an equal voice, and whose pervading spirit is the common right of all mankind. After such a definition, who shall pretend that he is injured? After such an assurance, who shall have the hardihood to complain?

But the world does not owe its creation to science; it existed long before the name of science was known, ever a prey to the clash and commotion inseparable from that perpetual struggle of good and evil, which is the dominant principle internally of our nature, externally of our condition.

Democracy has sprung from this struggle: it is a war-cry; it is the banner raised by the many occupying the lower ranks, against the few placed above them;—a banner that has been raised sometimes in the name of rights the most sacred, sometimes in the name of passions the most gross and the most unbridled, elevated sometimes against usurpations the most iniquitous, and sometimes against governments the most legitimate.

In the ancient republics, where the badge of slavery debased the lower orders, and caused the free classes to form a closer bond of union with each other, where the narrow limits of the state conferred so much importance upon each individual citizen, where the executive government appeared so frequently before the eyes of the people, and where, consequently, the ascendency of the few could not so easily be transformed into actual and durable tyranny; democracy, or the power of the many, was regarded as the greatest danger likely to befal the community. It was viewed as the dominion, at once absurd and anarchical, of the poor over the rich, of the ignorant over the enlightened, of the multitude over all that was illustrious in the state. Such was the estimation in which it was held, and such are the terms in which it was described by all the philosophers whom the world admires, however their theories might differ in other respects; by the Sensualists and the Spiritualists, by the Utopians and the Utilitarians, by Epicurus as well as by Zeno, by Plato as well as by Aristotle.

After the overthrow of the Roman dominion, in the chaos whence sprung what may be termed the modern world, affairs assumed a different aspect.

At the commencement of this epoch, and indeed long after that time, the influence exercised in the social system by fortuitous and arbitrary power was immense. The majority of the population being dispersed, ruined, deserted, spirit-broken, and abased, formed no longer a people, nor even a class in the state. The dominion of the few became established in a form more unrestrained, more dependent upon individual caprice, and more inimical to every idea of general order than had, perhaps, ever before been witnessed by mankind.

Nevertheless, in the midst of this unlicensed and barbarous oppression, the mightiest emancipation known to the human race commenced and was accomplished. Slavery gradually disappeared. Every man became free by virtue of the very title—MAN; and with the name of freeman, now unconditionally enjoyed by all mankind, the hopes and claims of liberty, indefinite, but on that account so much the more powerful, were universally diffused.

In proportion as it was enfranchished this population became distributed into a multitude of classes and conditions of startling dissimilarity, and possessing property and social rights in very unequal degrees. This inequality of freedom aroused all the passions of humanity, and placed society in a state of internal fermentation hitherto unexampled.

Never had society comprised so many freemen, never had the freemen been divided into so many unequal grades, never had the line which marked out the limits between the higher and lower orders, in the social scale, been so broadly developed, nor the struggle between them so violent and so uninterrupted.

Neither was this state of affairs any longer confined within the walls of a single city, nor within the boundaries of some small territory, but prevailed alike in vast states, growing daily in extent, whose interests, becoming daily more vast and more complicated, escaped more and more from the clear knowledge and direct control of their population, increasing in number, importance, ambition, and activity.

But this is not all; nor are these the most important facts to be weighed and considered in the application of democratic principles to our modern communities.

Whilst, in the political system, these events were thus developed, continually widening the circle of the democratic movement, in the moral system two sublime principles, religion and philosophy, or faith and reason, stamped upon that movement a dignity and an importance which antiquity had never foreseen.

Whenever modern democracy has been an opponent of the Christian religion, it has shown itself most ungrateful. It is not my intention to allude to the influence produced by Christianity upon manners and upon minds, to the transformation which it has effected in domestic relations, to its share in the abolition of slavery, nor to the numerous other social modifications in which its influence, for the benefit of mankind at large, has been visible and supreme. I confine myself to a fact more profound, though frequently overlooked, but of which, unless I am much deceived, the importance has never been duly considered.

It is the first religion that was founded, and continued for a long period to exist, independent of the state; the first which created and organised the religious community altogether separate from the civil. The Christian people had already existed for ages; they had possessed for ages their codes, their institutions, their assemblies, their magistrates, their decrees, their punishments, and their ordinances, when Constantine was pleased to decree that the Roman people should become Christians.

During the period of its isolated existence, when divided from the civil order, the Christian community reposed upon these two bases—the brotherhood of all men in the faith of Jesus Christ, and the equality of all men before God.

The Saviour came down for all, had addressed himself to all, and was sacrificed for all. All had an equal right to come to him, and to be saved through him.

God is so exalted, that before him all distance between men, all inequality, would disappear, just as beneath lofty mountains all else appears smooth and upon a level.

Who would have given utterance to such thoughts, who would even have harboured them in the bosom of the civil community, in the presence of his rulers, and in the name of his interests alone? But the religious community professed and proclaimed them with enthusiasm, when speaking before God, and in the name of salvation.

When religious faith became associated with the civil order, when the state had become Christian, the two communities were nevertheless far from being confounded with one another; for, notwithstanding their reciprocal adoption and their intimate union, they remained distinct, each retaining its own peculiar government; and from the rivalry of their governments speedily arose struggles which permanently maintained that distinction.

It was at that time the constant endeavour of the religious community, and of its government, to assimilate itself more and more to the civil, and to diffuse wider its ideas, its sentiments, its maxims, and its laws. That the state should live according to the example of the church; that the state should think, speak, and act in conformity with the church; that the people of the state should be as one with the people of the church; are the principles which the Christian church has advocated and acted upon without intermission; such, (and let no believer be offended at my words, for they are full of respect,) such was her Utopia.

It was an Utopia of the sixteenth no less than of the eleventh century. Knox maintained it in the presence of Mary Stuart, as did Gregory VII. in that of the Emperor Henry.

It was an Utopia whose most efficacious weapon was the extension and the application of those principles, full of power and attraction, upon which, in its separate existence, the religious community was based,—of the fraternity of believers in Jesus Christ, and the equality of all men before God; that is to say, the principles most favourable to the increase and acceleration of the democratic movement, already so far spread and so active among the civil community.

A day arrived when the church beheld with anxiety the tendency of this movement; and, as in her profound knowledge of the opposite wants of man, she professed those principles which elevate his hopes, in conjunction with those which restrain his passions, she sought, in her lofty hierarchy, in her powerful moral discipline, in her respect for established order, in her views upon the origin and nature of power, for the means of curbing within bounds that movement which she had seconded. She now became the ally of the few against the pretensions of the many, as, upon a former occasion, she had been the protectress of the people against the oppression of the great.

But the movement continued; democracy was ever making further advances. The church herself, however, did not abandon those maxims which had contributed to her gradual elevation. There existed at the bottom of the moral which Massillon preached to the great ones of the earth, a policy very different from that by which Bossuet sought to restrain the ambition of the multitude.

And moreover, at the same moment, when the church beat a retreat and furled the standard of her Utopia, another power advanced and took possession of this standard. Reason declared herself heiress of the faith; philosophy undertook to follow up the work of religion.

In the same manner that the struggle between temporal and spiritual power had conduced to the emancipation of the many, so, in the sphere of spiritual power itself, a struggle soon commenced, which in a similar manner could not fail to impart a new and powerful impulse to modern communities.

Beyond the precincts of the church, and even within her own bosom, arose the Freethinkers, opposing her dominion over the mind. Two intellectual powers, one religious, the other secular, were now contending against each other. The latter espoused the cause of the individual rights of free intelligence, while the former had maintained the universal rights of organised intelligence.

And so soon as the church appeared to manifest some diminution of zeal in regard to her two democratic maxims—the fraternity of Christians and their moral equality,—the Freethinkers seized upon them, and boldly secularized them, applying to the world, and to the present state of existence, what the church applied to heaven and to a future state.

In the hands of secular philosophy, the fraternity of believers in Jesus Christ became the general fraternity of mankind—humanity. The equality of men before God became equality before the law.

Such are the facts. It is in the midst of such circumstances, and under the influence of such ideas, that modern communities have developed themselves. I confine myself to glancing at them cursorily. In the same manner I shall glance at their principal results as regards democracy, and the characters under which it has manifested itself.

Materially, it has extended, widely extended itself; it has embraced all mankind.

It has proclaimed in the name of all their right to all. It has exalted its pretensions and its promises above all things; above power and liberty, above happiness and virtue, above the pleasures of earth and above the glory of heaven.

It has therefore gained much;—

In material power,

In moral authority,

In vigour of impulse and propagation.

And at the same time by a natural and necessary effect of its position in our history,

Democracy has descended in the social scale infinitely lower than it had ever done before;

It has recruited and engaged in its service power more brutal, passions more gross, ideas more narrow, and pretensions more blind;

It has been more than ever deficient in unity, foresight, and consistency. It has been a prey to numberless dissensions, which produced internal weakness; to miserable trifling, which brought it into moral disrepute; to violent and glaring oscillations, producing political sterility.

Yet throughout its career, at the most distinct epochs, in the midst of triumphs as well as of reverses, the primitive and essential character of the democratic movement has undergone no change. It has ever been, as I have before observed, a war; the war waged by the many occupying the lower ranks, against the few placed above them.

This war has produced tremendous consequences —consequences of which the world has but just begun to reap the fruits.

It has destroyed;—

The feudal system, or the personal power of one man over another by virtue of the right of property;

The system of castes, or the immovable and perpetual concentration of social privileges and power in the hands of a few;

The system of the right divine, lay or ecclesiastical, that is, the presumption of representing God upon earth, and the suppression of all human control over power.

These are the victories of modern democracy. They are victories at once glorious and legitimate, and although they have been dearly purchased, they are, perhaps, worth even more than they have cost.

But victory is as nothing if it be not productive, and the state of war is not the social state. In contests with its enemies, in its external and warlike relations, modern democracy has proved powerful and successful. Considered in itself, with reference to its internal life, viewed no longer as engaged in contending for its right or its ambition, but in the calmer aspect of triumphing, and responding to its triumph, what principles of social order has it professed? Upon what basis has it pretended to reconstruct society, rent from its ancient foundations?

It has professed two principles, which may be described in the following terms;

Personal sovereignty, or the right of every indidual over himself;

The sovereignty of the number, which its partizans, in order to disguise it, term the sovereignty of the people, or the right of the majority over the minority.

Whoever considers modern democracy closely, and brings but a small share of penetration to the task, will discover, without difficulty, that all its ideas, all its attempts at social organization, issue from and finally return to these principles.

And what is the value of these two principles, either as regards their absolute truth, or viewed as a means of social organization?

I think I hear the reply: This is a question exclusively philosophical, in the outset at least; I am well aware of it. But politics pretend no longer to evade the scrutiny of philosophy. Thought is become a power, and will not resign its influence. Without doubt this self-confidence of the modern mind is tainted with much vanity and weakness, but it is not all vanity and weakness: events have proved this, and will add still further proof, if there be need. Moreover, it is a noble weakness, which, even in reprehending, one cannot fail to respect.

I will first consider the principle of personal sovereignty.

Every man is lord over himself. No authority, no law are to be considered legitimate by him, unless sanctioned by his will. In other words, and this is the popular form of the principle, no one is bound to yield obedience to laws to which he is not himself a consenting party.

Setting out with this principle, Rousseau has denounced all government founded upon representation: "The will," he says, "does not admit of being represented, it is the same or it is different, there is no medium." Since man's own will is the sole legitimate source of his power over himself, how can he delegate that power to another? Can he cause his will to reside away from him? He would then create not a representative, but a master. All representation then is deceitful, and all power based upon representation is tyrannical; for liberty consists in the sovereignty over ourselves, and man is only free in so far as he obeys no other will than his own.

The consequence is unavoidable. Rousseau was wrong but in one respect; he did not carry his argument far enough. Had he carried it to its full extent, he must have declared the unlawfulness of every durable law, and of all permanent power.

What does it signify that a law received my sanction yesterday, if to-day my will has changed? Can I only exercise my will once? Does my will exhaust its authority by a single act? And as that is the sole master that I am bound to obey, must I submit for the rest of my life to the slavery of obeying those laws, from which this master who made them commands me to liberate myself?

Such is the tendency of this principle in its full extent. Rousseau either did not perceive, or durst not look upon it. It is destructive of all government, nay more, of all society; it does not permit a man to contract any engagement, nor to bind himself to any law, and carries the seeds of dissolution even into the bosom of each individual, since he can no more bind himself to himself than to another; for his by-gone will, that is, his will which has had its exercise, possesses no more authority over him than the will of any other person. Rousseau, indeed, observes, "It is absurd that the will should fetter itself with chains for the future."

With less consistency than Rousseau, who was thus deterred from being consistent, others have adopted the principle without noticing any of the perplexities in which it involves reason. Assuming always for their doctrine that no man is bound to obey power which he has not recognized, and laws to which he has not assented, they have boasted that upon such a basis they could construct a government,—a government perfectly legitimate, and one in which there should be no deficiency of the rights or the powers requisite for the maintenance of society.

No sooner have they commenced their work than lo! a preliminary obstacle is suddenly discovered. How, if no law is to be imposed upon men without their own consent, is it possible to collect, upon every law, the opinion of each individual? Rousseau did not hesitate. He condemned the system of associating together in great nations and extensive states, while he proclaimed the necessity of enclosing society within the walls of small municipal republics, and proposed to unite them together by a federal system; which, however, he has not explained, and which, so long as he rejected altogether the principle of representation, he would have found it impossible to establish.

In this hypothesis it is evident that the democratic principle was far from being carried into force, and the problem far from being solved. However, an impossibility, an inconsistency seemed provided against.

Others have not entertained such scruples: pressed by the impossibility, they have replaced it by a new inconsistency. They have proposed to abolish the right of men yielding obedience only to such laws as have emanated from their will, and to substitute in its place the right of observing only such laws as should emanate from a power constituted according to their will. Here, in spite of Rousseau, the principle of representation again appeared.

It has been attempted to disguise the nature of representation. It is not a representation of the will, say they, but of interests and opinions. Fruitless labour! if the will of man be his sole legitimate sovereign, when an attempt is made to found the legitimacy of power upon a system of representation, it is his WILL that must of necessity be represented.

Some have gone further: after having annulled, as far as regards the law itself, so many individual wills, it would seem to be necessary, at least, to confer upon them all a voice in the appointment of that power to which the making of their laws is to be deputed. Universal suffrage would then be the imperious consequence of the principle already so glaringly violated. In reality, however, this has never been admitted; in theory, it has never been boldly and fully professed. Everywhere some restriction has been placed upon the privilege of voting at the election of the legislative power. Only two philosophers, to my knowledge, Condorcet and Godwin, and they with extreme hesitation, have argued in favour of the right of women. In every system minors, servants, and some other classes have been excluded; but by what right? They possess the will as well also as the right of yielding obedience to none but a legitimate power. Thus, while it is admitted that to the will alone of each individual belongs the right of founding the legitimate sovereign, a multitude of individuals are not even admitted to a share in the creation of that artificial sovereign which the representative system is to impose upon all.

I might pursue this subject, and were it possible to witness the attempt at establishing this government, we should behold at every step that principle upon which they affirm that it is to be called into action, vanish away; and inconsistency would be incessantly requisite to surmount impossibilities, or to re-establish reason.

Supposing the work accomplished, and the government actually founded, I ask how great the authority of the principle will then be, and what rights this power, which owes its legitimacy alone to the wills of individuals, would exercise over them?

According to some, the individual wills which have created the legislative power, will have sustained no diminution of their sovereignty by that act; it belongs to them freely and absolutely as before. This power is merely that of a subject charged with carrying into execution those laws which it has received from others, constantly subordinate to that other power which remains diffused among individuals, and which, though it has neither form nor voice, is not the less universally supreme and immutable, and always possesses the right of changing its servant at pleasure.

According to others, the wills of individuals in creating a general power become, as it were, merged in it. They renounce their own authority in favour of their representative, and he represents them in their whole energy, and to the full extent of their sovereignty.

Here we have a pure and simple despotism; a despotism arising from strict adherence to the principle of representing individual opinions, and one which has in fact more than once appeared in governments formed under the influence of this idea; the government of Napoleon for example. Most assuredly this cannot be what the friends of freedom would desire from representation and democracy.

Less formidable, perhaps, because circumstances would never permit it to exist, the first system possesses in no respect a greater degree of solidity. If the individuals who have created the legislative power are bound to obey the laws which emanate from it, then is their sovereignty at an end. If it be otherwise, if the will of the legislative power fail to unite with itself the wills of those individuals that established it, what becomes of this power? in fact, of government? of society itself?

It cannot be that TRUTH imposes upon man so much confusion, impossibility, and incoherence. It cannot be that the right of nations to a legitimate government, and of citizens to liberty, depends upon a principle which is foredoomed to the alternative either of destroying society altogether, or of laying the foundation of tyranny. The evil lies in the principle itself. IT IS NOT TRUE that man is sole lord over himself; that his will is his sole legitimate sovereign; that no power, no law is binding upon him unless sanctioned by his consent.

When philosophers have considered man in himself with respect only to the connexion between his activity and his intelligence, they have never for a moment ventured to assert that his will was his only legitimate law, that is to say, that every action would be reasonable or just, solely because it was free and voluntary. They have all recognised as superior to the will of the individual a certain controlling law, known by the name either of reason, morality, wisdom, or truth, from the dictates of which he cannot permit his conduct to depart, without making either an absurd or culpable use of his liberty. In all systems, whether we speak of interest, innate sense, human custom or duty, whether it be the spiritualist or the materialist, the believer or the sceptic, all agree that there are actions which are reasonable or unreasonable, just or unjust; all agree that if a man possess the liberty of acting, either in opposition to or in accordance with reason and truth, this liberty by no means causes an act, in itself absurd and criminal, to lose that character because it is voluntary; nor does it sanction the act as reasonable or right merely because the will prompted its performance.

As soon as the individual consulting his intelligence before employing his liberty, recognizes that rule which prescribes reason or morality to his conduct, he cannot fail at the same time to acknowledge that he did not institute this rule; that it is not the arbitrary offspring of his will, and that its abolition or its alteration is alike beyond his control. His will is free to obey or to disobey his reason, but his reason in its turn is independent of his will, and possesses the privilege of judging, after the rule it has recognised, the will which does not submit to it.

Considered, therefore, separately, and with reference to himself, the individual does not act arbitrarily and according to his own will; his will is not his sole legitimate sovereign; it is not the power which creates and imposes upon man those laws of obligation, the existence of which he cannot deny. He receives them from a higher source; they issue from a more exalted sphere than that of liberty; from a sphere where the question lies not between what man desires or disapproves, but between what is true or false, just or unjust, conformable or contrary to reason. In descending from this sublime sphere to that of action and of life, these laws traverse the domain of liberty which is situated on the confines of the two worlds; and there arises the question whether free will shall or shall not conform to the laws of sovereign reason. But in whatever manner this question may be decided, the right of imposing the law, that is to say, the sovereign power, does not depart from reason in order to reside with the will. In no case does the will possess the privilege of conferring upon acts which it sanctions, the character of being legitimate; they either possess this character or not in proportion as they accord with or oppose the laws of eternal reason, the sole source of all legitimate power.

In other words, man does not exercise, by virtue of his liberty, an absolute sovereignty over himself. As an intelligent and moral being he is subject to laws which are not of his own creation, and which are binding upon him in right; although, as a free being, he has the power of refusing his obedience to them, but not his assent.

How comes it then, that quitting the consideration of man separately and in himself, in order to consider him in his relations with other men, philosophers have adopted a principle which they found unavailable as the basis of their moral doctrines, and converted it into the basis of their political creed? How comes it that the will, which in the personal existence of the individual has never been exalted to the rank of his legitimate sovereign, is at once invested with that title and with those rights, when the individual has entered the state of social existence, and appears in the presence of other beings of the same nature as himself?

The fact admits of no doubt; the cause is as follows: In that association and collision of individuals denominated society, philosophers have been especially struck with that which presents itself first to our notice, namely, the association and collision of individual wills. The instinct of truth has suddenly reminded them, that the will is not in itself, and by virtue of itself, the legitimate sovereign of man. If it does not hold this rank in the case of an individual, and with reference to his personal conduct, why should it be raised to that position with regard to another individual, and for the conduct of another? How can man, in the name of his will, arrogate that sovereign power over another which his own will does not possess over himself? No will, as a mere will, and by that title alone, possesses power over the will of another: that is indisputable. The contrary pretence is revolting; it is pure violence; it is despotism.

How is despotism to be avoided? How are the pretensions of violence to be repelled?

If, in social relations, only the wills of individuals stood in opposition to one another, the problem would not admit of solution. Philosophers have appeared to think so. They have forgotten that will is not all that constitutes man; that in his intercourse with his equals, he also brings into action his intelligence, his moral nature, and his reason, the image more or less complete of that intelligence, that reason, and that nature, which are divine. Regarding, therefore, in the social state, no other relation than that of one will to another, they have been unable to discover any other guarantee for legitimate freedom of will than its complete independence. In order to establish its right to independence, they have proclaimed its sovereignty; bestowing, by this means, upon the will of each individual, in opposition to that of every other, a plenitude of right which it does not possess over itself, and declaring, for the purpose of emancipating one man from the caprice of another, that his own caprice is his only law.

A principle which, in respect of man's relation to himself, is evidently false and subversive of all morality, cannot possess any more value in the intercourse between man and man. In both cases the legitimacy of law and power depends upon the same conditions, and emanates from the same source; this source being far above the will, either of him who commands, or of him who obeys.

Two facts will occupy the place of arguments:—

Who has ever denied the legitimacy of the paternal authority? It has its limits; and, like all human power, it may also have its excess; but has it ever been pretended that it becomes illegitimate so soon as obedience on the part of the child is involuntary? Nevertheless, the will exists in the child; it partakes of the same nature as that of the full-grown man, and is equally dear to the individual. Whence, then, is derived the legitimacy of this power, even when obedience is no longer voluntary? Is it from the bodily strength of the father? No; it is from his moral superiority. Legitimate empire belongs neither to the will of the child that is deficient in reason, nor even to the pure will of the father; for the will neither of the old nor the young, the weak nor the strong, is capable, in any case, of conferring a right of itself alone; that power belongs only to rational and superior intelligence. To the father is given the capacity, and, moreover, the obligation, of teaching reason to the child, and of subjecting its will to reason, until the time arrives when the child shall become capable of governing its own will. Hence the legitimacy of the paternal power. Hence, also, the rules and the process of good education; that is to say, the legitimate exercise of this power. The right is founded upon the superiority of intelligence and reason in the father: neither the will of the latter, nor that of the child contains the principle of that right, nor arbitrarily directs its application.

Another fact:—When the madness or mental weakness of a man becomes established, although society might have nothing to fear from that man, he is, nevertheless, deprived of his liberty. By what right? has the will that existed in him perished? If it be the only source of legitimate power, is it not always in its place to exercise that power? Yes, the will is there; but the true sovereign of man, the legitimate lord over the will itself, REASON, is extinct in the individual. It is therefore necessary that some law should be provided for him from without; that the reason of others should direct him, since his own is no longer capable of presiding over his will.

What is true of the child, the madman and the idiot is true also of mankind in general. In all social relations, as in those just alluded to, in the intercourse between man and man, as in his relation to himself, no one possesses the right to make a law according to his own will, or to refuse obedience to a law only because he disapproves of it. Whether viewed as a question of command or of resistance, of government or of liberty, the will alone confers no right, no legitimate power; Reason and Justice are completely supreme over all will.

Instead, then, of elevating the wills of individuals to the rank of sovereigns,—indeed of rival sovereigns,—they ought rather to be classified as subjects obeying the same sovereign. In the place, therefore, of declaring that every man is lord over himself, and that no man possesses power over him, unless he consent to that power being exercised, we must declare that no man is lord either over himself or any other man, and that none have a right to refuse obedience to Truth. We must, in fact, proscribe all absolute power in any form, instead of allowing it to take refuge in the uncontrolled will of each individual, and acknowledge in every man that right which he indisputably possesses, of obeying only the ordinances of justice and reason, instead of ascribing to him that right which he does NOT possess, of yielding obedience only to his will.

Thus falls to the ground the theory of personal sovereignty: thus vanishes this primary democratic principle; false as a question of right, and impracticable in reality, it is the mortal enemy, no less of moral than of social order, and is calculated to produce, in the mind of man, nothing but disquietude, in society, nothing but anarchy.

Does the sovereignty of numbers, or of the people, considered philosophically and practically, possess more value?

No one has ventured to interpret the sovereignty of the people in the following sense, viz. that after the collection of each individual will, that of the majority shall constitute law; while, at the same time, the minority should not be accounted liable to obey such resolutions as might be adopted contrary to its recorded will.

Nevertheless, such a provision would be required by this pretended personal sovereignty, which is the primary basis of the sovereignty of the people, and which holds no individual to be amenable to those laws which are not sanctioned by his express consent.

Individual consent, it is affirmed, is anterior and general. On his entry into the confederation, each citizen binds himself to accept any law which shall have received the sanction of the majority.

Those who make assertions of this description maintain, at the same time, that man has no right to alienate his liberty, and that it is absurd for his will to forge chains for the future.

They are fully aware of the contradiction, for they strive to evade it, by having recourse to another reply. Whoever, they exclaim, becomes dissatisfied with the will of the majority may withdraw from the confederation; it has no longer any right to retain him; but if he remain, it is a proof that he prefers submission to withdrawal, thus sanctioning, by an unfettered act, the law which he had denounced.

Here, then, we behold society in a state of permanent dissolution, which must terminate in a speedy destruction, if minorities, always varying in number, should successively retire; or, as the alternative, we behold the citizen doomed never to utter a complaint, compelled to acknowledge as just and legitimate whatever finds favour with the majority, and to consider himself free because he is always at liberty to make choice between his will and his country.

Do people such as these really know what it is we call our country? Do they really know the nature of those powerful ties which bind a man to the soil of his birth-place? Do they imagine that he can dispose of his existence with the same facility as of his person. Six feet of earth are sufficient only for the dead, and to them alone it matters not where; but the living are not to be satisfied with so small a space, and are not so indifferent as to the spot. A man's existence is centred where his interests, his feelings, his habits, his moral and social being, are most firmly rooted. This is his country, and it cannot be transported elsewhere.

I can conceive nothing more insulting, nothing which conveys a more malicious taunt to a man, than to address him thus: "You must dissolve all these ties if your will does not coincide with ours; and upon this condition only shall your liberty be respected, and your rights remain inviolate."

This offer is in itself a deceit. In all places, and at all times, ever since nations have existed, those nations have been unwilling to consider that the citizen who quitted them in order to withdraw himself from their laws, had become absolutely a foreigner; they have often demanded exactions from, and imposed burthens upon him. Factions have often cruelly abused this idea which the instinct of nations, however, has constantly sanctioned, thus proclaiming it to be untrue that any man may blot from his memory, if he chooses, the recollection of his native land, and that a country has performed what is due to the liberty of her sons when she permits them to estrange themselves from her.

Hence it is evident that those who, for the purpose of maintaining the sovereignty of the number, are compelled to offer the right of emigration as the sole guarantee of liberty, grant her but few attractions, and are unable indeed to realize even those with which they have themselves invested her.

Let then the sovereignty of the number renounce these vain subterfuges, and let it consent to stand forth such as it is in reality, the absolute power of the majority over the minority; in other words, a tyranny.

Let us examine one by one the assumptions of this tyranny.

We have already beheld that of individual sovereignty sink to the ground.

I cannot for a moment suppose it will be seriously contended that the right of the majority is derived from its material strength: this would be not only a gross insult to the sanctity of right, but also an extremely vain pretension. Thank God! neither man nor society is so constituted that power (I mean that which confers absolute authority) can belong to the many and to its material preponderance. It is not the power of the arms that can exact obedience, nor is it the strength that can raise the heaviest weights, which is called into question in matters relating to submission and government; that strength is a moral and complex power, which results from an infinity of causes, and manifests itself under forms the most various. It numbers amongst its elements intelligence, science, riches, prudence, public confidence, and tradition, united with many others. It has belonged to families, to religious corporations, to hereditary senates, to elective assemblies, but seldom, perhaps never, to the many. Whatever may be the form or the appearance of a government, it is neither the many, nor its material strength, which confers or withdraws authority.

Another argument more forcible, and indeed the only one worthy of serious consideration, is advanced in favour of the absolute power of the majority. I am anxious to place it not only in a clear, but in the most favourable light.

If individual will be bound to submit to legitimate authority, no human power is exempt from the necessity of proving that it is, and that it shall remain legitimate; that is to say, just, wise, and expedient. The problem of social organization is a double one: it consists in guaranteeing, on the one side, the rights, and on the other, the merits of power. It is a condition at once laborious and difficult, which renders it compulsory for a man by turns to defend his liberty against all unlawful power, and lawful power against his own liberty; but the condition is both imperious and inevitable; it flows from the imperfection of our nature, and is only the image of that strife to which each may find a parallel in his own bosom.

In proportion, then, as lawful power possesses a right over the liberty of mankind, so far has liberty a right of demanding from power the proof of its legitimacy. It is in this that the right of liberty consists, that liberty is itself a right.

Whence, then, shall this proof be adduced? It is necessary that it should manifest itself by some exterior signs: that a simple positive test should be brought forward to guarantee the legitimacy of power.

The majority in universal suffrage; such, we are told, is the necessary test;—let every will be consulted, and every voice computed. That authority which is elected by the greatest number will possess a right to obedience, for it will have proved its legitimacy.

Very few words will suffice. The world is old: let us consider its history: let every dispassionate man observe what is continually passing around him. I will use the mildest and most moderate terms; the majority is very often in error; it errs so much the more, as the questions submitted to its decision are of greater importance: it errs with immense danger to society, if we consider its power alone. What is the course of those governments themselves which are said to be founded upon this principle? They are always painfully struggling against the consequences of their organization; they labour constantly to repress the power of the majority, after having pompously proclaimed it. What quackery and inconsistency, what deceit and peril in this pretended enthronement of the multitude! No, the majority in universal suffrage is neither the certain proof nor the best guarantee of the legitimacy of power: experience loudly declares it.

But I am anxious to examine still more closely the questions of the right of suffrage and the guarantees of liberty.

We must be cautious; born with a narrow and animal spirit we can perceive nothing but that which strikes our material vision; delicate and complicated facts, indirect influences, intricate combinations altogether escape us. Never, perhaps, has the knowledge of the natural resources of the world, and the concealed paths of Providence, been more rare. Whenever we cease to behold assemblies, elections, urns, and votes, we picture to ourselves absolute power, and liberty without guarantees.

It is not alone the partizans of the democratic system who fall into this error; it is no less, though in a contrary sense, the error of the absolutists, who exultingly appeal to the example of a family. There, they exclaim, the power is sole and independent; its legitimacy is derived from its nature; none of those who obey are permitted to question it; neither wife nor children possess the privilege of dissenting from the will of the husband or the father. Nevertheless, a family is the most primitive, and also the mildest of communities.

It is true: no nation has ever dreamed of regulating by laws, and in the name of public power, the internal relations of families; nor of introducing into domestic life those forms required elsewhere to guarantee the just exercise of power, and the rights of liberty.

Is this to declare, that these relations may be surrendered to the caprices of an independent will? or that in such relations power can never be abused, no right can ever be invaded, and that thus there exists no necessity for the interference of human laws?

By no means. In domestic, as well as in all other relations, power must be legitimate, and liberty must be respected. In them, also, this moral necessity may be misunderstood or violated; in them, also, those guarantees are necessary which the imperfection of mankind imposes as the condition of every society.

But these guarantees, in all cases indispensable, are not always of the same form, nor of the same origin; they exist in a family, independent of all written law. The all-powerful hand of Providence has fixed them at the basis of every domestic relation, which they govern with the empire of necessity; and as they are, in general, sufficient for the purposes of this government, mankind has not felt it requisite to reduce them to the form of laws.

Rut although they are not of human institution, and have no legal form, still these guarantees do not differ in their nature; everywhere they are derived from the same principle, and tend to the same effect. In a family, as in a government, their object is to compel power to acknowledge certain limits, to respect rights, and to exercise itself with reason and justice in respect to the liberties by which it is surrounded.

Who has ever pictured to himself a husband or a father in the light of a sovereign estranged from his subjects, compelling them to obey his absolute orders, without consulting, and even without knowing them, by the exercise of force alone, or by the aid of such combinations as implant social strength, where material does not exist?

In truth, there is nothing here in common with the exercise of conjugal or paternal power. However sovereign the father may appear, he is neither arbitrary nor independent; he observes, listens to, and consults those who are bound to obey him; he is constantly negotiating with their reason and their liberty; he modifies his will according to their dispositions or their ideas; and conducts himself in fact, naturally and necessarily, according to that protecting principle of right, which provides that power shall justify its legitimacy, by insuring a cheerful obedience.

It may be asserted, with the strictest truth, that the rudest savage in the forests of America is inclined, and even feels an obligation, to exercise towards his wife and children a greater degree of justice, and entertains a higher regard for their liberty, than the mildest despot on earth displays in his relations with the mass of his subjects.

What signifies it that the right of suffrage, in this case, does not assume some material form, by the presence of an urn, and the depositing of a ballot? What signifies it that it is neither written in laws, nor exercised according to their enactments? It exists actually in the family. Nowhere is power more constantly limited and controlled, nowhere more imperiously regulated by reason and justice, owing either to the bias of its nature, or the necessity of its condition. Providence has so ordained, that the happiness of a family, its repose, its daily prosperity, are closely allied with the sympathetic conviction, and the voluntary submission of all the members that compose it. Have we not here the principle of free governments? Is not this the end which they strive to attain in other relations and by other methods?

Blind, then, are those who are unable to recognize the guarantees of liberty in no institutions, and under no forms, but such as are democratic; and no less blind are those who expect to discover, in the natural construction of a family, arguments in favour of absolute power.

I leave the question of families. I enter into the consideration of those communities, by no means extensive however, which, under the various names of tribe, commonalty, city, or corporation, contain a certain number of families and individuals united to a similar destiny, and under similar laws, by a certain community of origin, language, habitation, and interest. I adopt the most favourable hypothesis; I discard all those results of force, all those accidents which are so intimately connected with the development of human societies. I wish to select one which shall be a stranger both to conquest and to servitude, which comprises neither masters nor slaves, victors nor vanquished,—which naturally, and without effort, seeks to secure in its institutions the guarantee for all liberties and for all rights.

Here also the right of suffrage presents itself only in a state of restriction. It is confined to heads of families, or, at most, does not extend to those men who are about to become so, that is to say, those who have arrived at an age when the progress both of their strength and reason renders them capable of governing themselves, and of directing their own affairs.

Is this to be considered an usurpation? Are not women, who exercise virtually, but indirectly, with respect to their husbands, the right of suffrage; are not minors, who are trained up to it under the eyes of their parents, excluded in this case by reason only of their weakness? And by the same rule is the first step taken by a man quitting the house of his father to enter society, properly so called, an act of tyranny?

If the right of obeying laws only so long as they are equitable and wise, necessarily entail the right of judging in person the wisdom and justice of the power which created those laws, it is, in fact, a tyranny. The former of these rights belongs as much to females and minors, as it does to men; and belongs to them no less in the affairs of state, than in the relations of a family. This primary and universal restriction of the right of suffrage would therefore be an act of the greatest and most extensive injustice.

This can never be. Injustice towards three-quarters of the human race could never become an established principle, and as such perpetually acknowledged by the reason of mankind.

There are then permanent and variable rights; rights which are the property of all, and rights which are not so. Every individual possesses and exercises the former by virtue of the sole claim that he is born of man, and walks erect in the presence of Heaven; the latter belong to him only under other conditions, and he may, without any violation either of justice or truth, form a member of a community in which he does not possess them at all.

Permanent and universal rights are all centred in the right of obeying only such dispensations as are just and wise. Variable rights are all comprised in the right of suffrage, that is to say, in the right of passing judgment, directly or indirectly, upon the wisdom of laws and government.

It is sufficient merely to affirm that the former rights are never absent from any individual, whatever may be the nature of the power that governs him, or the society in which he is placed. That the latter vary according to individuals and communities, is incontestibly proved by everything that occurs naturally and by common admission in the transition from a family into society, properly so called.

What is the principle of this variation?

Society, however simple may be its structure, has other affairs than such as are merely domestic to engage its attention; affairs that demand an extent of capacity not possessed by females and minors. Let us suppose a discussion to arise in some savage tribe, or in some state already civilized, relative to a warlike expedition, or the adoption of a civil law, neither women nor minors are capable of deciding upon interests of this description; Providence has destined the former for a state of existence purely domestic, while the latter have not yet attained to the plenitude of their individual existence, and the full power of their faculties.

Naturally, then, and by the operation of one of those providential laws, in which fact and right are harmoniously blended, the right of suffrage does not belong to them. Capacity, then, is the principle, the necessary condition of right.

And the capacity here spoken of is not merely that of intellectual development, or the possession of this or that particular faculty, it is a complex and profound whole, comprising spontaneous authority, habitual situation, and natural acquaintance with the different interests to be regulated; in fact, a certain aggregate of faculties, knowledge, and methods of action which animate the whole man, and which decide, with more certainty than his spirit alone, upon his course of conduct, and the use which he will make of power.

Where these conditions are found united, in that man resides political capacity; where that capacity is wanting, right does not exist.

This is essentially a special and variable right; it is neither inherent in every man, nor independent of the different conditions of society. Its primary and unvarying principle is capacity, and its sphere is determinable by the affinity of the capacity of those individuals who exercise it, to the affairs of that community in which they exercise it.

When a community increases, the right of suffrage contracts; when capacity becomes more general, and its standard higher among men, the right of suffrage extends itself. It will be found less diffused in a great, than in a small nation; more widely extended amongst an enlightened, than an ignorant people. Its legitimate limit is a concealed principle which unfolds itself in a ratio with the material and moral development of society; and in a free community, in proportion as this principle is well or badly defined in its laws, so that community is well or ill governed, and becomes steady or unsteady under the hand of its government.

Is more needed to bring to light the utter vanity, both theoretical and practical, of the sovereignty of the many and universal suffrage? Equally with that of personal sovereignty, this principle is repudiated by philosophy and history, by reason and experience: both are alike false and powerless.

In the history of humanity they have their period and their office; they are mighty engines of war, terrible arms of attack and destruction.

Thus: man has been the property of man; power has aspired to absolute sovereignty. Some feeble government takes up these arrogant maxims; war ensues. It is proclaimed that every man is lord over himself, and that no one possesses authority over him unless he consents. The absolute independence of the individual rises in opposition to the shadow of feudal servitude and the right divine.

Political rights and privileges have been exclusively concentrated in the hands of a small number. This concentration no longer appears justifiable, upon the plea of superiority eitherin riches, influence, intelligence, or moral and social strength. The multitude rises, and exclaims, Let us count our numbers; we are all equal; let the power belong to the many.

It is thus that the new maxims oppose the old; they are true when received in their negative sense, and are powerful engines of destruction. The ancient edifice yields to the vigour of their attacks, and falls to the ground.

This is a fearful, but under the decrees of Providence, a predestined work. When the ancient edifice becomes contracted, inconvenient, uninhabitable, ruinous, and defended only by a corps of invalids, its fall is inevitable; and the battering ram, the sap and the mine, detach it from the soil with a force that threatens even the soil itself.

But when the work of destruction is consummated, and the hour of reconstruction arrives; when the necessity of it is universally admitted; when it is commenced spontaneously in all directions, what can be more absurd, what more mischievous, than to continue still sounding the attack, and directing against the rising edifice, to the peril of its artificers, the very engines which subverted the old one?

What would at present be the effect, were their empire perpetuated, of the two pretended democratic principles which I have just examined?

We deplore anarchy of mind, the relaxation of all ties and moral obligations, the weakening of all respect, the rude tone of self-sufficiency, the abasement and mutability of ideas, as well as of power, the tendency towards a narrow, inconsistent, and degrading course of thought and action;—such are evidently the evils under which society at present labours, and which essentially retard its progress.

But these are, nevertheless, the natural consequences, carefully deduced, of the maxim, that man is sole lord over himself; and of that other maxim, that power belongs to the many, and ought therefore to be equally shared amongst all, since all mankind count alike.

In juxta-position with these maxims, let us place the necessary and essential principles of all regular and durable society; viz.—

Permanent unity of social opinion represented by government;

Respect for public authorities;

Subordination of individual inclinations to the law;

Partition of rights according to capacity;

Universal guarantee of liberty to every grade of persons; the supremacy of government being rigidly secured, for the affairs of the community are above all others, and can only be conducted by those who occupy a lofty position in the social scale.

Such are the maxims of good sense, and the fundamental principles of social order.

Let a community be democratic or aristocratic; be its form of government monarchical or republican, it matters little. These principles are not the less necessary, for they result, not from this or that condition of society, not from this or that form of government, but from the nature of man himself, and all human relations: so that wherever they degenerate, not only government, but society itself becomes tottering and degraded.

The more a community becomes free, and the more ardently it aspires to liberty, so much the more should it place itself under the empire of these tutelary principles, for they alone can tolerate the bold and healthy development of freedom.

How can we reconcile such principles,—the principles of orderly times, of organization and conservatism, with the maxims prevalent at periods of crisis, the maxims of war and destruction?

This is manifestly impossible; we must choose.

And if we should fail to choose, or choose indiscreetly,—if the maxims of war and destruction be permitted to retain their empire, not only would the community suffer materially, not only would its progress be arrested, but the fruits of the victory themselves must be endangered; for a community will not consent to its own demolition, and when it feels itself shaken from its basis, when impossible conditions are imposed upon it, a violent struggle must ensue, and it will endeavour to replace itself upon its natural foundations, no matter at what cost.

The real triumphs of modern democracy, viz. the limitation of power by the representative system, civil equality, the equal eligibility of all to public offices, the extension of individual liberty, require for their own preservation a return to the only true principles, those conservative of social order.

Let, then, modern democracy fully comprehend its ancient history, and its new condition.

It has been a state of warfare; a war of the lower against the higher orders, of the many against the few, of the little against the great.

In this warfare it has espoused maxims, displayed passions, raised up pretensions, and listened to doctrines, adapted to a condition of war, and the overthrow of a tottering government, lamentable to the cause of peace, and subversive of a progressing community.

At present, thanks to the triumph of the good cause, and to God, who permitted that triumph, positions and interests are changed.

There is no longer a war to be waged between the lower and upper ranks; there is no longer occasion to raise up the standard of the many against the few. No obstacle now exists to prevent either individuals, or the multitude from improving their condition, except indeed those obstacles which are natural and inherent to the condition of humanity, such as God has ordained it; a state of perpetual labour, frequently difficult, and tedious to be borne. God has destined man to exertion, and exertion itself does not always receive its reward on earth.

No longer, therefore, is there legitimate cause, no longer colourable pretext for adhering to the maxims, pretensions, and passions so long ranged together under the banner of democracy. What was formerly democracy would now be anarchy; the democratic spirit is now, and will long continue, nothing but the spirit of revolution.

Not but that society still comprises, and must of necessity comprise, high and low, rich and poor; not but that much remains to be accomplished, far more than the most ambitious dream of, for the moral and material condition of the multitude. But the reciprocal position of high and low, rich and poor, is at present regulated according to the dictates of justice and liberality. Each possesses his rights, his position, and his prospects, well defined. And with regard to future progress, the field is open before us, a wide field indeed, already conquered, and which it will be the work of ages to occupy regularly with Order and Peace.

The dominant and urgent, the moral and material necessities of society, at the present day, consist in construction and organization; for it is deficient in both. Ideas, ambition, habits, social relations, and internal dispositions, all require regulation and extension among us. And the old democratic systems must, above all, prove fatal to us, inasmuch as they tend to retard the progress of general improvement. We should thus creep along in the revolutionary track, instead of ameliorating and advancing our condition. We all fear the recurrence of the past: let modern democracy strive to bury in oblivion the recollections connected with its former existence; let it occupy the high position it has conquered for itself; then only will it satisfy the present, and be able to look forward to the future in security.

THE END.

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